Travel News from msnbc.com

Here's the latest news from the mainstream viewpoint, includes a story about a man with a urostomy bag having a humiliating experience during a TSA pat down, videos, and a list of all the U.S. airports now offering the new enhanced security.

Does anybody else remember how fun it used to be to fly? People had huge parties at the airports, meeting arrivals and seeing people off was normal for Americans. I tended bar at both major Alaskan airports so I know airport bars were our old social hubs, even for people traveling with children. Then the communitarians came along and started regulating Americans' public drinking and smoking and eating and in my opinion, it's all gone straight downhill from there. I believe that when we allowed trained facilitators to tell us what was bad for us and allowed them to press their opinions into law, we gave up our adulthood and became wards of Big Mother. If our neo government has the power to tell us how many drinks we can order in one night, then why would we expect to be able to say we won't pull our pants down if we need a spanking?

Seems like all kinds of horror stories about tsa harassment that happened over the past eight years are being revived for recently planned "opt out" days. I read a new old story every day. Makes me wonder what it would have been like if the Germans and Italians had internet in the 30s and we moderns had all their blogs and facebook pages to study for similarities.

It's kind of weird but I'm getting regular hits on the TSA job post I made of the local craigslist ad for Anchorage Airport TSA testers, from people looking for information about how to apply. Is it ethical for me to trick unsuspecting people into coming to my blog?

TSA pat-down leaves traveler covered in urine
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40291856/ns/travel-news

SNL TSA spoof http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=joIxWcFO3bY

Song/video: Don't Touch My Junk (with a blatant pitch for Alex Jones embedded in the script) http://www.lewrockwell.com/blog/lewrw/archives/70298.html

Thanks to Connie for finding these links!

Adept Congressman takes us down the dialectical path

Airports Weigh Congressman's Call To Ditch TSA

Published: November 18, 2010

by The Associated Press

In a climate of Internet campaigns to shun airport pat-downs and veteran pilots suing over their treatment by government screeners, some airports are considering another way to show dissatisfaction: ditching TSA agents altogether.

Federal law allows airports to opt for screeners from the private sector instead. The push is being led by a powerful Florida congressman who's a longtime critic of the Transportation Security Administration and counts among his campaign contributors some of the companies who might take the TSA's place.

Furor over airline passenger checks has grown as more airports have installed scanners that produce digital images of the body's contours, and the anger intensified when TSA added a more intrusive style of pat-down recently for those who opt out of the full-body scans. Some travelers are using the Internet to organize protests aimed at the busy travel days next week surrounding Thanksgiving.

For Republican Rep. John Mica of Florida, the way to make travelers feel more comfortable would be to kick TSA employees out of their posts at the ends of the snaking security lines. This month, he wrote letters to nation's 100 busiest airports asking that they request private security guards instead.

"I think we could use half the personnel and streamline the system," Mica said Wednesday, calling the TSA a bloated bureaucracy.

So, now the "debates" are not over whether HS/TSA performs a legitimate function in a free society, it's between using govt thugs versus private sector thugs. Who wins that argument?

TSA Screeners and Innappropriate Touching of Children

The Communitarians insist that Americans must "BALANCE" their individual liberty against the needs of the Zionist global collective.

To a Communitarian, everything we do is a privilege that can be taken away at any time, for any reason they deem reasonable. They distorted the meaning of the word "reasonable" in order to push their rationalization in ways we could not defend against.

For years the Communitarian guru Dr. Amitai Etzioni has been telling us that Americans must willingly give up some of their privacy in order to maintain security. We're following a guru without having any idea we even have a guru who's more moral than us.

BALANCING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST CITIZEN RESPONSIBILITIES to the collective is the ENTIRE BASIS of the Israeli terrorist Etzioni's "moral" lectures to Americans. Etzioni is the "everything expert," and while few Americans have ever even heard of him, everything that is going on in the "balancing of rights" department is his Communitarian "logic."

I am one of those mothers prepared to assault anyone who tries to touch my children. I did not allow my family or my babysitters or even my ex-husband to spank my kids or touch them anywhere. Friends and roommates were all forewarned that if they did anything to my kids I would kill them with my bare hands. My daughter was taught that nobody had the right to touch her privates, not even me unless it was to clean her after she used the toilet. When a teenage boy put his hand up her dress in a store when she was eight, she immediately screamed and ran to tell the cashier while the kid ran away. I hunted for that perpetrator all night with full permission from a Fairbanks Police Officer to beat the crap out of him if I found him.

What kind of people don't protect their children? Brainwashed Communitarians.

Listen to the father of this little girl use Etzioni's rationale for this "necessary" touching:
TSA Screener Accosts 3 Year Old Child at Security Checkpoint
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article26809.htm#idc-cover

So TSA can stick their hands on our children's behinds while others are arrested for it?
Subsitute Teacher Arrested for Inappropriate Touching
http://blogs.phoenixnewtimes.com/valleyfever/2010/11/yuma_substitute_teacher_says_a.php

What other "jobs" allow this kind of touching?
What's Inappropriate Touching at Work?
http://www.businessmanagementdaily.com/articles/19545/1/Whats-Inappropriate-Touching-at-Work/Page1.html#

People keep suggesting we should all stop flying now. Maybe instead we should give up our automobiles and all buy private airplanes and learn to fly them ourselves ... small ones are almost cheaper than a new car. Anything to avoid the real issue... right?

Checkpoint Chertoff: A Neo- American Nightmare

Checkpoint Charlie

http://www.dailysoft.com/berlinwall/history/checkpoint-charlie.htm

A fact little known to most Americans, and certainly a surprise to this writer, Zionists gained a foothold in our federal government under President Wilson. The United States began quietly adopting the Talmud (not the written Torah/Bible) as the basis of our national law after the first Zionist judge was appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Louis Brandeis was an assimilated Jew from Kentucky. He had had little formal association with Jews being more closely identified with the Brahmanism of the Bostonian social elite. Ironically, Louis Brandeis, who was to become the energetic exponent in word and deed, the legitimizer of American Zionism, descended from Judaism darkest heretical rejecters, the Jacob Frank heresies.

Jacob Frank converted, as did many of his followers, to Christianity believing in a perverted salvation theory that through the debasement of Judaism the Messiah could be forced from heaven. It was from heretical adherents of Frankist beliefs that Louis Brandeis, the spiritual and moral salvation, the galvanizer, the leader of American Zionism, and reputedly even his wife, descended from. http://www.jewishmag.com/118mag/richard_gottheil/richard_gottheil.htm

By 1939, federal agencies created under Roosevelt's New Deal had become a "headless fourth branch of government," and more Zionists were appointed to the Supreme Court. In 1941 Roosevelt created a committee to study the problem of federal agency rule making and suggest solutions. In 1941 the Report was made.

The need for re framing rule making under Zionist Communitarian Administrative Laws was delayed until after the end of WWII. Initially, the U.S. Congress was opposed to the Zionist "solution" because it violated the Separation of Powers clause in the U.S. Constitution. (I haven't the resources or the time to study the "compromises" that led to passage of the act.)

"By demonstrating the philosophy of Jewish law and its moral values,
we can bring a little beacon of light in this world,"
Noson Gurary, founder of the U.S. National Institute for Judaic Law

By the time Bush II was president, the National Institute for Judaic Law was introduced openly " to make Jewish law more accessible to everyone." What is "Jewish Law" in Israel?

The Emergency Regulations of 1945 consist of 170 articles divided into 15 sections. They deal with censorship, the restriction of freedom of movement, every aspect of control of the freedom of speech and the press, control of the various means of transport, regulation on the possession of arms, etc. The laws give the minister of defense the power to appoint military commanders as governors over any area he may see fit. On appointment, the governor automatically becomes a competent authority with the power to enforce, at his own discretion, all powers covered by the Defense Laws. (4)

Alleged grounds for issuing an order of administrative detention under the Defense Regulations are: "To secure public safety, the maintenance of public order or suspicion of mutiny, rebellion or riot." While the detainee is permitted theoretically to be represented by counsel, if word of his detention gets out, neither the detained nor his or her counsel is permitted to know the grounds for designating the detainee a security risk.

A soldier or policeman may hold a suspect for four days, a police officer can extend it for an additional seven days and a higher ranking officer can add another seven days. In total, a person can be brought before a military judge for the first time after eighteen days of detention.

http://www.palestine-encyclopedia.com/EPP/Chapter25.htm

My initiation into the cult of Zionist programs was involuntary. When the Seattle Community Developers used our neighborhood to test new ways to give "community" police access to private homes in order to gather our personal information, I did everything I could to "opt out." I cited U.S. laws and codes and begged, pleaded and demanded my right to not participate in this clearly unconstitutional program... all to no avail. I had lived all my life under the assumption that American law was Supreme in the United States. The brutal truth was, to say the least, shocking. Prior to 1999 I knew next to nothing about Israel, nor did I care to know anything. It was certainly not introduced as a topic that my children's freedom depended upon my knowing.

Checkpoint Chertoff
http://www.lewrockwell.com/blog/lewrw/archives/69451.html

“We’ve borrowed this from what the … Israelis do,” Chertoff said during his 2007 address to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, explaining that “it involves looking at behavior, and training officers to be out in the actual flow at the airport and in the actual flow in some of our mass transit to watch the behavior of people; how they react as they approach the checkpoint, how they react as they’re unloading things. And that cues us that there may be some people we want to take a closer look at. This, by the way, is a concept that we’ve used at the border for many years, which is training people to look for human behavior which is the giveaway as to whether somebody is planning something big.” OPERATION VIPER: http://grendelreport.posterous.com/dhs-tests-airport-checkpoints

When every attempt I made to "withdraw" from the program was denied, I began investigating the "neo" community police who were created to enforce the new laws. I looked for all the ways they were gathering our private INFORMATION. I studied DOJ's new GIS database and the EXPANDED AUTHORITY to USE it to "predict and prevent crime." I read and re read the stated goal of every COPS (Community Oriented Policing Services) GIS program tested on us. Along the way I learned about the foundation for Communitarian/Community Law, the Talmud.

"The Anti Defamation League documented a criticism that alleges that the Talmud endorses child molestation involving children under the age of three.^[120] The text of the Talmud is from tractate Kethubot 11b: "If an adult has sex with a girl under the age of three, it is ignored, for it is like putting a finger in someone’s eye [i.e., tears may drip from the eye but there will always be more tears to replace them; so too the hymen of a girl so young may break but it will heal]."^[121] This criticism was published by Pranaitis and repeated by modern sources.^[122] However, the context of this statement is within a discussion of divorce settlements - which are higher for the wife if the wife was a virgin at the time of marriage - and that text means that if the wife was molested as a young child, she is still considered a virgin for purposes of the divorce.^{[123][124]" http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_the_Talmud}

Who is Michael Chertoff and what values does he hold? Apparently he's one of the good guys fighting the Evil Axis, and like so many modern U.S. elected officials from every party and platform, he's obviously devoted to doing god's work.

Chertoff Joins Defense Firm that Defrauded U.S.
Saturday, March 27, 2010

Michael Chertoff, the former homeland security chief who’s not been shy about exploiting terrorist threats for the benefit of his clients, has decided to join a top defense contractor that defrauded the U.S. government.

The one-time head of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under President George W. Bush is now a board member of BAE Systems, the United Kingdom-based defense corporation that agreed to pay $447 million in fines to the American and British governments to settle allegations of corruption, including bribing a top Saudi Arabian official.

BAE is the eighth-largest contractor doing business with Washington, having received $7.1 billion in government contracts in 2009 alone. It also has received more than $200 million from DHS since 2005.

Following the attempted bombing of a Northwest Airlines flight on Christmas Day, Chertoff was seen on television calling for the government to buy full-body scanners for airport checkpoints. Chertoff failed to mention in numerous interviews that his consulting business represented the company, Rapiscan Systems, that makes the scanners.

-Noel Brinkerhoff

Chertoff Joins BAE, Defense Contractor Recently Embroiled In Bribery Scandal (by Dan Froomkin, Huffington Post)

Secretary Michael Chertoff Joins BAE Systems, Inc. Board of Directors (BAE Systems press release)

Defense Contractor Agrees to Pay $400 Million Criminal Fine (by Noel Brinkerhoff, AllGov)

Chertoff Exploits Detroit Plane Bomb to Stir up Business for Client (by Noel Brinkerhoff, AllGov)

As TSA's Administrative authority to stop, interrogate and detain American travelers extends to vehicles OUTSIDE U.S. airports, what can we expect America to "evolve" into next?

Gaza checkpoints in 2002
http://israelmatzav.blogspot.com/2010/01/playmobil-tsa-security-checkpoint.html

How many U.S. laws is TSA exempt from? How about we start with The Privacy Act of 1974?

++++

For those who choose further study:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 114(l)(1), 40113, 5 U.S.C. 552a(j) and (k).

Source: 69 FR 35537, June 25, 2004, unless otherwise noted.

§ 1507.1 Scope.

This part implements provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 (the Act) that permit TSA to exempt any system of records within the agency from certain requirements of the Act. The procedures governing access to, and correction of, records in a TSA system of records are set forth in 6 CFR part 5, subpart B.

§ 1507.3 Exemptions.

The following TSA systems of records are exempt from certain provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j), (k), or both, as set forth in this section. During the course of normal agency functions, exempt materials from one system of records may become part of one or more other systems of records. To the extent that any portion of system of records becomes part of another Privacy Act system of records, TSA hereby claims the same exemptions as were claimed in the original primary system of which they are a part and claims any additional exemptions in accordance with this part.

(a) Transportation Security Enforcement Record System (DHS/TSA 001). The Transportation Security Enforcement Record System (TSERS) (DHS/TSA 001) enables TSA to maintain a system of records related to the screening of passengers and property and they may be used to identify, review, analyze, investigate, and prosecute violations or potential violations of criminal statutes and transportation security laws. Pursuant to exemptions (j)(2), (k)(1), and (k)(2) of the Privacy Act, DHS/TSA 001 is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I), and (f). Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of the investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of TSA, as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would therefore present a serious impediment to transportation security, law enforcement efforts, and efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a record to impede the investigation and avoid detection or apprehension, which undermines the entire system.

(2) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to the records contained in this system of records could inform the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of the investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of TSA, as well as the recipient agency. Access to the records would permit the individual who is the subject of a record to impede the investigation and avoid detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities, and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations to be continuously reinvestigated. The information contained in the system may also include properly classified information, the release of which would pose a threat to national defense and/or foreign policy. In addition, permitting access and amendment to such information also could disclose sensitive security information, which could be detrimental to transportation security.

(3) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of Information) because in the course of investigations into potential violations of transportation security laws, the accuracy of information obtained or introduced occasionally may be unclear or the information may not be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In the interests of effective enforcement of transportation security laws, it is appropriate to retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of unlawful activity.

(4) From subsection (e)(3) (Privacy Act Statement) because disclosing the authority, purpose, routine uses, and potential consequences of not providing information could reveal the investigative interests of TSA, as well as the nature and scope of an investigation, the disclosure of which could enable individuals to circumvent agency regulations or statutes.

(5) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I) (Agency Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules), because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d).

(b) Transportation Workers Employment Investigations System (DHS/TSA 002). The Transportation Workers Employment Investigations System (TWEI) (DHS/TSA 002) enables TSA to facilitate the performance of background checks on employees of transportation operators and others who are issued credentials or clearances by transportation operators, other than TSA employees. Pursuant to exemptions (k)(1) and (k)(2) of the Privacy Act, DHS/TSA 002 is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I), and (f). Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures), because release of the accounting of disclosures could reveal investigative interest on the part of the recipient agency that obtained the record pursuant to a routine use. Disclosure of the accounting could therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts on the part of the recipient agency, as the individual who is the subject of a record would learn of third-agency investigate interests and thereby avoid detection or apprehension.

(2) From subsection (d) (Access to Records), because access to the records contained in this system could reveal investigate techniques and procedures in the transportation workers employment investigation process, as well as the nature and scope of the employment investigation, the disclosure of which could enable individuals to circumvent agency regulations or statutes and obtain access to sensitive information and restricted areas in the transportation industry. The information contained in the system might include properly classified information, the release of which would pose a threat to national defense and/or foreign policy. In addition, permitting access and amendment to such information could reveal sensitive security information protected pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 114(s), the disclosure of which could be detrimental to the security of transportation.

(3) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of Information), because third-agency records obtained or made available to TSA during the course of an employment investigation may occasionally contain information that is not strictly relevant or necessary to a specific employment investigation. In the interests of administering an effective and comprehensive transportation worker employment investigation program, it is appropriate and necessary for TSA to retain all such information that may aid in that process.

(4) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I) (Agency Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules), because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d).

(c) Personnel Background Investigation File System (DHS/TSA 004) . The Personnel Background Investigation File System (PBIFS) (DHS/TSA 004) enables TSA to maintain investigative and background material used to make suitability and eligibility determinations regarding current and former TSA employees, applicants for TSA employment, and TSA contract employees. Pursuant to exemptions (k)(1) and (k)(5) of the Privacy Act, the Personnel Background Investigation File System is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) (Accounting of Disclosures) and (d) (Access to Records). Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified because this system contains investigatory material compiled solely for determining suitability, eligibility, and qualifications for Federal civilian employment. To the extent that the disclosure of material would reveal any classified material or the identity of a source who furnished information to the Government under an express promise that the identity of the source would be held in confidence, or, prior to September 27, 1975, under an implied promise that the identity of the source would be held in confidence, the applicability of exemption (k)(5) will be required to honor promises of confidentiality should the data subject request access to or amendment of the record, or access to the accounting of disclosures of the record. Exemption (k)(1) will be required to protect any classified information that may be in this system.

(d) Internal Investigation Record System (DHS/TSA 005) . The Internal Investigation Record System (IIRS) (DHS/TSA 005) contains records of internal investigations for all modes of transportation for which TSA has security-related duties. This system covers information regarding investigations of allegations or appearances of misconduct of current or former TSA employees or contractors and provides support for any adverse action that may occur as a result of the findings of the investigation. It is being modified to cover investigations of security-related incidents and reviews of TSA programs and operations. Pursuant to exemptions (j)(2), (k)(1), and (k)(2) of the Privacy Act, DHS/TSA 005 is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I), and (f). Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because release of the accounting of disclosures could reveal investigative interest on the part of the recipient agency that obtained the record pursuant to a routine use. Disclosure of the accounting could, therefore, present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts on the part of the recipient agency, as the individual who is the subject of a record would learn of third-agency investigative interests and thereby avoid detection or apprehension, as well as to TSA investigative efforts.

(2) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to the records contained in this system could reveal investigative techniques and procedures of the investigators, as well as the nature and scope of the investigation, the disclosure of which could enable individuals to circumvent agency regulations or statutes. The information contained in the system might include properly classified information, the release of which would pose a threat to national defense and/or foreign policy. In addition, permitting access and amendment to such records could reveal sensitive security information protected pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 114(s), the disclosure of which could be detrimental to the security of transportation.

(3) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of Information) because third agency records obtained or made available to TSA during the course of an investigation may occasionally contain information that is not strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In the interests of administering an effective and comprehensive investigation program, it is appropriate and necessary for TSA to retain all such information that may aid in that process.

(4) From subsection (e)(3) (Privacy Act Statement) because disclosing the authority, purpose, routine uses, and potential consequences of not providing information could reveal the targets of interests of the investigating office, as well as the nature and scope of an investigation, the disclosure of which could enable individuals to circumvent agency regulations or statutes.

(5) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I) (Agency Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules), because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d).

(e) Correspondence and Matters Tracking Records (DHS/TSA 006). The Correspondence and Matters Tracking Records (CMTR) (DHS/TSA 006) system allows TSA to manage, track, retrieve, and respond to incoming correspondence, inquiries, claims and other matters presented to TSA for disposition, and to monitor the assignment, disposition and status of such matters. This system covers information coming into TSA from individuals as well as information recorded by TSA employees in the performance of their duties. Pursuant to exemptions (k)(1) and (k)(2) of the Privacy Act, DHS/TSA 006 is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I), and (f). Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures), because release of the accounting of disclosures could reveal investigative interest on the part of the recipient agency that obtained the record pursuant to a routine use. Disclosure of the accounting could therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts on the part of the recipient agency, as the individual who is the subject of a record would lean of third-agency investigative interests and thereby avoid detection or apprehension.

(2) From subsection (d) (Access to Records), because access to the records contained in this system could reveal investigative interest on the part of TSA or other agency and the nature of that interest, the disclosure of which could enable individuals to circumvent agency regulations or statutes. The information contained in the system might include properly classified information, the release of which would pose a threat to national defense and/or foreign policy. In addition, permitting access and amendment to such information could reveal sensitive security information protected pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 114(s), the disclosure of which could be detrimental to transportation security.

(3) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and necessity of Information), because third-agency records obtained or made available to TSA during the course of an investigation may occasionally contain information that is not strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In the interests of administering an effective and comprehensive investigation program, it is appropriate and necessary for TSA to retain all such information that may aid in that process.

(4) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I) (Agency Requirements), and (f) (Agency rules), because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d).

(f) Freedom of Information and Privacy Act Records (DHS/TSA 007). The Freedom of Information and Privacy Act (FOIA/PA) Records System (DHS/TSA 007) system enables TSA to maintain records that will assist in processing access requests and administrative appeals under FOIA and access and amendments requests and appeals under the PA; participate in associated litigation; and assist TSA in carrying out any other responsibilities under FOIA/PA. Pursuant to exemptions (k)(1) and (k)(2) of the Privacy Act, Freedom of Information and Privacy Act Records are exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I), and (f). Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures), because release of the accounting of disclosures could reveal investigative interest on the part of the recipient agency that obtained the record pursuant to a routine use. Disclosure of the accounting could therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts on the part of the recipient agency, as the individual who is the subject of a record would learn of third-agency investigative interests and thereby avoid detection or apprehension.

(2) From subsection (d) (Access to Records), because access to the records contained in this system could reveal investigative interest on the part of TSA or other agency and the nature of that interest, the disclosure of which could enable individuals to circumvent agency regulations or statutes. The information contained in the system might include properly classified information, the release of which would pose a threat to national defense and/or foreign policy. In addition, permitting access and amendment to such information could reveal sensitive security information protected pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 114(s), the disclosure of which would be detrimental to transportation security.

(3) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and necessity of Information), because third-agency records obtained or made available to TSA during the course of an investigation may occasionally contain information that is not strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In the interests of administering an effective and comprehensive investigation program, it is appropriate and necessary for TSA to retain all such information that may aid in that process.

(4) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I) (Agency Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules), because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d).

(g) General Legal Records System (DHS/TSA 009). The General Legal Records (GLR) System (DHS/TSA 009) enables TSA to maintain records that will assist attorneys to perform their functions within the office of Chief Counsel, to include providing legal advice, responding to claims filed by employees and others, and assisting in litigation and in the settlement of claims. Pursuant to exemptions (k)(1) and (k)(2) of the Privacy Act, DHS/TSA 009 is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I), and (f). Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures), because release of the accounting of disclosures could reveal investigative interest on the part of the recipient agency that obtained the record pursuant to a routine use. Disclosure of the accounting could therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts on the part of the recipient agency, as the individual who is the subject of a record would learn of third-agency investigative interests and thereby avoid detection or apprehension.

(2) From subsection (d) (Access to Records), because access to the records contained in this system could reveal investigative interest on the part of TSA or other agency and the nature of that interest, the disclosure of which would enable individuals to circumvent agency regulations or statutes. The information contained in the system might include properly classified information, the release of which would pose a threat to national defense and/or foreign policy. In addition, permitting access and amendment to such information could reveal sensitive security information protected pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 114(s), the disclosure of which could be detrimental to transportation security.

(3) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of Information), because third-agency records obtained or made available to TSA during the course of an investigation may occasionally contain information that is not strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In the interests of administering an effective and comprehensive investigation program, it is appropriate and necessary for TSA to retain all such information that may aid in that process.

(4) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I) (Agency Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules), because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsections (d).

(h) Federal Flight Deck Officer Records System (DHS/TSA 013). The Federal Flight Deck Officer Record System (FFDORS) (DHS/TSA 013) enables TSA to maintain a system of records documenting the application, selection, training, and requalification of pilots deputized by TSA to perform the duties of a Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO). Pursuant to exemptions (k)(1), (k)(2), and (k)(6) of the Privacy Act, DHS/TSA 013 is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), and (e)(1). Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From (c)(3) (Accounting of Certain Disclosures) and (d) (Access to Records), because access to the accounting of disclosures in this system could reveal the identity of a confidential source that provided information during the background check process. Without the ability to protect the identity of a confidential source, the agency's ability to gather pertinent information about candidates for the program may be limited. In addition, the system might contain information that is properly classified, the release of which would pose a threat to national security and/or foreign policy, or information the disclosure of which could be detrimental to the security of transportation pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 114(s). Finally, the agency must be able to protect against access to testing or examination material as release of this material could compromise the effectiveness of the testing and examination procedure itself. The examination material contained in this system is so similar in form and content to the examination material used in the selection process for TSA security screeners, or potential selection processes that TSA may utilize in the future, that release of the material would compromise the objectivity or fairness of the testing or examination process of those TSA employees.

(2) From (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of Information), because information obtained or made available to TSA from other agencies and other sources during the evaluation of an individual's suitability for an FFDO position may occasionally include information that is not strictly relevant or necessary to the specific determination regarding that individual. In the interests of effective program administration, it is appropriate and necessary for TSA to collect all such information that may aid in the FFDO selection process.

(i) Registered Traveler Operations Files (DHS/TSA 015) . The purpose of this system is to pre-screen and positively identify volunteer travelers using advanced identification technologies and conduct a security threat assessment to ensure that the volunteer does not pose a security threat. This system may expedite the pre-boarding process for the traveler and improve the allocation of TSA's security resources on individuals who may pose a security threat. Pursuant to exemptions (k)(1) and (k)(2) of the Privacy Act, DHS/TSA 015 is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I), and (f). Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the subject of heightened security concerns relating to an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of an investigative interest on the part of the Department of Homeland Security or another Federal law enforcement or other recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would therefore present a serious impediment to transportation security law enforcement efforts and efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a record to impede the program suitability determination, which undermines the entire system.

(2) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to some of the records contained in this system of records could permit the individual who is the subject of a record to impede the program suitability determination. Amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing security assessment investigations and program suitability determinations and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring such investigations to be continuously reinvestigated. The information contained in the system may also include classified information, the release of which would pose a threat to national defense and/or foreign policy. In addition, permitting access and amendment to such information also could disclose sensitive security information protected pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 114(s) and 49 CFR part 1520, the disclosure of which could be detrimental to transportation security.

(3) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of Information) because in the course of screening applicants for program suitability, TSA must be able to review information from a variety of sources. What information is relevant and necessary may not always be apparent until after the evaluation is completed. In the interests of transportation security, it is appropriate to include a broad range of information that may aid in determining an applicant's suitability for the Registered Traveler program.

(4) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I) (Agency Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules), because this system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).

(j) Transportation Security Intelligence Service (TSIS) Operations Files. Transportation Security Intelligence Service Operations Files (TSIS) (DHS/TSA 011) enables TSA to maintain a system of records related to intelligence gathering activities used to identify, review, analyze, investigate, and prevent violations or potential violations of transportation security laws. This system also contains records relating to determinations about individuals' qualifications, eligibility, or suitability for access to classified information. Pursuant to exemptions (j)(2), (k)(1), (k)(2), and (k)(5) of the Privacy Act, DHS/TSA 011 is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I), and (f). Exemptions from particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the subject of intelligence gather operations and reveal investigative interest on the part of the Transportation Security Administration, as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would therefore present a serious impediment to transportation security law enforcement efforts and efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a record to impede operations and avoid detection and apprehension, which undermined the entire system. Disclosure of the accounting may also reveal the existence of information that is classified or sensitive security information, the release of which would be detrimental to the security of transportation.

(2) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to the records contained in this system of records could inform the subject of intelligence gathering operations and reveal investigative interest on the part of the Transportation Security Administration. Access to the records would permit the individual who is the subject of a record to impede operations and possibly avoid detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing intelligence and law enforcement activities and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations to be continually reinvestigated. The information contained in the system may also include properly classified information, the release of which would pose a threat to national defense and/or foreign policy. In addition, permitting access and amendment to such information also could disclose sensitive security information, which could be detrimental to transportation security if released. This system may also include information necessary to make a determination as to an individual's qualifications, eligibility, or suitability for access to classified information, the release of which would reveal the identity of a source who received an express or implied assurance that their identity would not be revealed to the subject of the record.

(3) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of Information) because in the course of gathering and analyzing information about potential threats to transportation security, the accuracy of information obtained or introduced occasionally may be unclear or the information may not be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific operation. In the interests of transportation security, it is appropriate to retain all information that may aid in identifying threats to transportation security and establishing other patterns of unlawful activity.

(4) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I) (Agency Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules), because this system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).

(k) Secure Flight Records . (1) Secure Flight Records (DHS/TSA 019) enables TSA to maintain a system of records related to watch list matching applied to air passengers and to non-traveling individuals authorized to enter an airport sterile area. Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) and (k)(2), TSA is claiming the following exemptions for certain records within the Secure Flight Records system: 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4); (e)(1), (2), (3), (4)(G) through (I), (5), and (8); (f), and (g).

(2) In addition to records under the control of TSA, the Secure Flight system of records may include records originating from systems of records of other law enforcement and intelligence agencies which may be exempt from certain provisions of the Privacy Act. However, TSA does not assert exemption to any provisions of the Privacy Act with respect to information submitted by or on behalf of individual passengers or non-travelers in the course of making a reservation or seeking access to a secured area under the Secure Flight program.

(3) To the extent the Secure Flight system contains records originating from other systems of records, TSA will rely on the exemptions claimed for those records in the originating system of records. Exemptions for certain records within the Secure Flight Records system from particular subsections of the Privacy Act are justified for the following reasons:

(i) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because giving a record subject access to the accounting of disclosures from records concerning him or her could reveal investigative interest on the part of the recipient agency that obtained the record pursuant to a routine use. Disclosure of the accounting could therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts on the part of the recipient agency because the individual who is the subject of the record would learn of third agency investigative interests and could take steps to evade detection or apprehension. Disclosure of the accounting also could reveal the details of watch list matching measures under the Secure Flight program, as well as capabilities and vulnerabilities of the watch list matching process, the release of which could permit an individual to evade future detection and thereby impede efforts to ensure transportation security.

(ii) From subsection (c)(4) because portions of this system are exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).

(iii) From subsections (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4) because these provisions concern individual access to and amendment of certain records contained in this system, including law enforcement counterterrorism, investigatory and intelligence records. Compliance with these provisions could alert the subject of an investigation of the fact and nature of the investigation, and/or the investigative interest of intelligence or law enforcement agencies; compromise sensitive information related to national security; interfere with the overall law enforcement process by leading to the destruction of evidence, improper influencing of witnesses, fabrication of testimony, and/or flight of the subject; identify a confidential source or disclose information which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of another's personal privacy; reveal a sensitive investigative or intelligence technique; or constitute a potential danger to the health or safety of law enforcement personnel, confidential informants, and witnesses. Amendment of these records would interfere with ongoing counterterrorism, law enforcement, or intelligence investigations and analysis activities and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations, analyses, and reports to be continuously reinvestigated and revised.

(iv) From subsection (e)(1) because it is not always possible for TSA or other agencies to know in advance what information is both relevant and necessary for it to complete an identity comparison between aviation passengers or certain non-travelers and a known or suspected terrorist. In addition, because TSA and other agencies may not always know what information about an encounter with a known or suspected terrorist will be relevant to law enforcement for the purpose of conducting an operational response.

(v) From subsection (e)(2) because application of this provision could present a serious impediment to counterterrorism, law enforcement, or intelligence efforts in that it would put the subject of an investigation, study or analysis on notice of that fact, thereby permitting the subject to engage in conduct designed to frustrate or impede that activity. The nature of counterterrorism, law enforcement, or intelligence investigations is such that vital information about an individual frequently can be obtained only from other persons who are familiar with such individual and his/her activities. In such investigations, it is not feasible to rely upon information furnished by the individual concerning his own activities.

(vi) From subsection (e)(3), to the extent that this subsection is interpreted to require TSA to provide notice to an individual if TSA or another agency receives or collects information about that individual during an investigation or from a third party. Should the subsection be so interpreted, exemption from this provision is necessary to avoid impeding counterterrorism, law enforcement, or intelligence efforts by putting the subject of an investigation, study or analysis on notice of that fact, thereby permitting the subject to engage in conduct intended to frustrate or impede that activity.

(vii) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (H) (Agency Requirements) and (f) (Agency Rules), because this system is exempt from the access provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(d).

(viii) From subsection (e)(5) because many of the records in this system coming from other system of records are derived from other domestic and foreign agency record systems and therefore it is not possible for TSA to ensure their compliance with this provision, however, TSA has implemented internal quality assurance procedures to ensure that data used in the watch list matching process is as thorough, accurate, and current as possible. In addition, in the collection of information for law enforcement, counterterrorism, and intelligence purposes, it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as further investigation brings new details to light. The restrictions imposed by (e)(5) would limit the ability of those agencies' trained investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise their judgment in conducting investigations and impede the development of intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement and counterterrorism efforts. However, TSA has implemented internal quality assurance procedures to ensure that the data used in the watch list matching process is as thorough, accurate, and current as possible.

(ix) From subsection (e)(8) because to require individual notice of disclosure of information due to compulsory legal process would pose an impossible administrative burden on TSA and other agencies and could alert the subjects of counterterrorism, law enforcement, or intelligence investigations to the fact of those investigations when not previously known.

(x) From subsection (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this system are exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).

(xi) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.

[69 FR 35537, June 25, 2004, as amended at 70 FR 33384, June 8, 2005; 71 FR 44227, Aug. 4, 2006; 72 FR 63709, Nov. 9, 2007]

TSA naked body scanners tested on London pubs six years ago

photo posted
By Justin Rohrlich November 5, 2010
American Airlines Pilots Revolt Against the TSA

I do remember the report about the London pub patrons who were rounded up and given the choice between the x ray scans or strip searches in 2004. Of course now the whole story is missing from the internet, (Update: Josef found it here) but it was in a UPI news report and I referenced it somewhere on my ACL website when it happened, probably the Community Policing page. 2004 was when a majority of the ACL was posted online. Maybe one of our English readers remember it happening, but very few Americans noticed it then and I haven't seen any reports about it now that this same "option" is being offered to air travelers in the USA. How long before people will be subjected to this outrageous demand to demean themselves in OTHER places besides airports? My guess is not long.

And seeing this pilot revolt letter I'm sad to realize as a group they are not revolting on behalf of ALL Americans demeaned by this new policy, just for their own group. How typical of the way Americans think nowadays. Separate rights for separate groups is okay if you're in the group that gets to "keep" your God given rights. Nobody was ever supposed to be able to "take" our rights, not from anyone who abides by the legitimate laws.

Now it's "policy" we have to abide by ... not law. .. policy which changes at the whim of the policymaker. Policy that over rules our national law... boy that's some heavy duty policy... don't ya think? Is there any identifiable theoretical policy that would be powerful enough to over rule the U.S. Constitution and ALL 50 state constitutions? Or is this expectation that we submit to this policy based on nothing at all? Is it a conspiracy theory to suggest there is some harmonization of legal values that lies at the basis for our continually evolving security policy?

http://www.discourse.net/archives/2004/03/beyond_weird_scary_mass_xray_searching_in_uk.html

Pilot to TSA: 'No Groping Me and No Naked Photos'

This came today from Consuelo. It confirms Etzioni's recent CNN article and his advice to our government. Many govt employees can use communitarian "reasons" for stripping our rights and liberties away. It's been a few years since I posted that article from an English newspaper where the London cops took an entire pub hostage and gave them the same choice between a virtual strip search and an actual strip search. Is strip searching bar patrons for drugs and weapons the next step here too? Communitarianism is, after all, a global justice program.

How many Americans are meekly submitting to these Israeli/Nazi checkpoints? Most of them?

Pilot to TSA: 'No Groping Me and No Naked Photos'

by Michael Roberts

October 15, 2010 – My name is Michael Roberts, and I am a pilot for ExpressJet Airlines, Inc., based in Houston (that is, I still am for the time being). This morning as I attempted to pass through the security line for my commute to work I was denied access to the secured area of the terminal building at Memphis International Airport. I have passed through the same line roughly once per week for the past four and a half years without incident. Today, however, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) agents at this checkpoint were using one of the new Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) systems that are currently being deployed at airports across the nation. These are the controversial devices featured by the media in recent months, albeit sparingly, which enable screeners to see beneath people’s clothing to an extremely graphic and intrusive level of detail (virtual strip searching). Travelers refusing this indignity may instead be physically frisked by a government security agent until the agent is satisfied to release them on their way in what is being touted as an "alternative option" to AIT. The following is a somewhat hastily drafted account of my experience this morning.

As I loaded my bags onto the X-ray scanner belt, an agent told me to remove my shoes and send them through as well, which I’ve not normally been required to do when passing through the standard metal detectors in uniform. When I questioned her, she said it was necessary to remove my shoes for the AIT scanner. I explained that I did not wish to participate in the AIT program, so she told me I could keep my shoes and directed me through the metal detector that had been roped off. She then called somewhat urgently to the agents on the other side: "We got an opt-out!" and also reported the "opt-out" into her handheld radio. On the other side I was stopped by another agent and informed that because I had "opted out" of AIT screening, I would have to go through secondary screening. I asked for clarification to be sure he was talking about frisking me, which he confirmed, and I declined. At this point he and another agent explained the TSA’s latest decree, saying I would not be permitted to pass without showing them my naked body, and how my refusal to do so had now given them cause to put their hands on me as I evidently posed a threat to air transportation security (this, of course, is my nutshell synopsis of the exchange). I asked whether they did in fact suspect I was concealing something after I had passed through the metal detector, or whether they believed that I had made any threats or given other indications of malicious designs to warrant treating me, a law-abiding fellow citizen, so rudely. None of that was relevant, I was told. They were just doing their job.

Eventually the airport police were summoned. Several officers showed up and we essentially repeated the conversation above. When it became clear that we had reached an impasse, one of the more sensible officers and I agreed that any further conversation would be pointless at this time. I then asked whether I was free to go. I was not. Another officer wanted to see my driver’s license. When I asked why, he said they needed information for their report on this "incident" – my name, address, phone number, etc. I recited my information for him, until he asked for my supervisor’s name and number at the airline. Why did he need that, I asked. For the report, he answered. I had already given him the primary phone number at my company’s headquarters. When I asked him what the Chief Pilot in Houston had to do with any of this, he either refused or was simply unable to provide a meaningful explanation. I chose not to divulge my supervisor’s name as I preferred to be the first to inform him of the situation myself. In any event, after a brief huddle with several other officers, my interrogator told me I was free to go.

As I approached the airport exit, however, I was stopped again by a man whom I believe to be the airport police chief, though I can’t say for sure. He said I still needed to speak with an investigator who was on his way over. I asked what sort of investigator. A TSA investigator, he said. As I was by this time looking eagerly forward to leaving the airport, I had little patience for the additional vexation. I’d been denied access to my workplace and had no other business keeping me there.

"Am I under arrest?" I asked.

"No, he just needs to ask you some more questions."

"But I was told I’m free to go. So… am I being detained now, or what?"

"We just need to hold you here so he can…"

"Hold me in what capacity?" I insisted.

"Detain you while we…"

Okay, so now they were detaining me as I was leaving the airport facility.

We stood there awkwardly, waiting for the investigator while he kept an eye on me. Being chatty by nature, I asked his opinion of what new procedures might be implemented if someday someone were to smuggle an explosive device in his or her rectum or a similar orifice. Ever since would-be terrorist Richard Reid set his shoes on fire, travelers have been required to remove their footwear in the security line. And the TSA has repeatedly attempted to justify these latest measures by citing Northwest flight 253, on which Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab scorched his genitalia. Where, then, would the evolution of these policies lead next?

"Do you want them to board your plane?" he asked.

"No, but I understand there are other, better ways to keep them off. Besides, at this point I’m more concerned with the greater threat to our rights and liberties as a free society."

"Yeah, I know," he said. And then, to my amazement, he continued, "But somebody’s already taken those away."

"Maybe they have," I conceded, watching the throng of passengers waiting their turn to get virtually naked for the federal security guards.

As a side note, I cannot refrain here from expressing my dismay and heartbreak over a civil servant’s personal resignation to the loss of civil liberty among the people by whom he is employed to protect and serve. If he no longer affirms the rights and freedom of his fellow citizens, one can only wonder exactly what he has in view as the purpose of his profession.

The TSA investigator arrived and asked for my account of the situation. I explained that the agents weren’t allowing me to pass through the checkpoint. He told me he had been advised that I was refusing security screening, to which I replied that I had willingly walked through the metal detector with no alarms, the same way I always do when commuting to work. He then briefed me on the recent screening policy changes and, apparently confused, asked whether they would be a problem for me. I stated that I did indeed have a problem with the infringement of my civil rights and liberty.

His reply: "That’s irrelevant."

It wasn’t irrelevant to me. We continued briefly in the conversation until I recognized that we were essentially repeating the same discussion I’d already had with the other officers and agents standing by. With that realization, I told him I did not wish to keep going around and around with them and asked whether he had anything else to say to me. Yes, he said he did, marching indignantly over to a table nearby with an air as though he were about to do something drastic.

"I need to get your information for my report," he demanded.

"The officer over there just took my information for his report. I’m sure you could just get it from him."

"No, I have to document everything separately and send it to TSOC. That’s the Transportation Security Operations Center where we report…"

"I’m familiar with TSOC," I assured him. "In fact, I’ve actually taught the TSA mandated security portion of our training program at the airline."

"Well, if you’re an instructor, then you should know better," he barked.

"Really? What do you mean I ‘should know better’? Are you scolding me? Have I done something wrong?"

"I’m not saying you’ve done something wrong. But you have to go through security screening if you want to enter the facility."

"Understood. I’ve been going through security screening right here in this line for five years and never blown up an airplane, broken any laws, made any threats, or had a government agent call my boss in Houston. And you guys have never tried to touch me or see me naked that whole time. But, if that’s what it’s come to now, I don’t want to enter the facility that badly."

Finishing up, he asked me to confirm that I had been offered secondary screening as an alternative "option" to ATS, and that I had refused it. I confirmed. Then he asked whether I’d "had words" with any of the agents. I asked what he meant by that and he said he wanted to know whether there had been "any exchange of words." I told him that yes, we spoke. He then turned to the crowd of officers and asked whether I had been abusive toward any of them when they wanted to create images of my naked body and touch me in an unwelcome manner. I didn’t hear what they said in reply, but he returned and finally told me I was free to leave the airport.

As it turned out, they did reach the chief pilot’s office in Houston before I was able to. Shortly after I got home, my boss called and said they had been contacted by the TSA. I suppose my employment status at this point can best be described as on hold.

It’s probably fairly obvious here that I am outraged. This took place today (now yesterday, when I wrote all this down), 15 October 2010. Anyone who reads this is welcome to contact me for confirmation of the details or any additional information I can provide. The dialog above is quoted according to my best recollection, without embellishment or significant alteration except for the sake of clarity. I would greatly appreciate any recommendations for legal counsel – preferably a firm with a libertarian bent and experience resisting this kind of tyrannical madness. This is not a left or right, red or blue state issue. The very bedrock of our way of life in this country is under attack from within. Please don’t let it be taken from us without a fight.

Malo Periculosam Libertatem Quam Quietum Servitium

Michael S. Roberts
3794 Douglass Ave.
Memphis, TN 38111
901.237.6308
FedUpFlyers@nonpartisan.com

October 18, 2010

Michael S. Roberts [send him mail] is a pilot for ExpressJet Airlines.

Copyright © 2010 by LewRockwell.com. Permission to reprint in whole or in part is gladly granted, provided full credit is given.

DHS Science & Technology Spokesman refutes TSA bracelet story as "false"

The other day I made a post about a new DHS technology reported about on a Washington Times blog. To my complete suprise, a DHS comment appeared to call the story, "Shocking but false." I checked around today, and this commentor went to several other blogs that linked to the WT blog and pasted in the exact same thing that was pasted into mine.

http://hoodathunk.wordpress.com/2008/07/09/a-method-to-ensure-ill-never-fly-a-passenger-carrier-again-updated/

http://www.flyertalk.com/forum/showthread.php?p=10010348

Here's the DHS blog about this "shocking but false" story on July 10:

http://www.tsa.gov/blog/2008/07/shocking-but-false.html

While some commentors ridicule the gullible people who believed such a thing was even possible, others make some astute observations about TSA's expanding powers, like the one who said, "After all, three years ago nobody ever would have believed TSA would ban water."

What I find most interesting about this, is that of ALL the things I write about the emerging communitarian government powers, this is the ONLY time I've ever got a rebuttal from an official government source. I post the UN-U.S. blueprints for sustainable development, I expose global U.S. Communitarian Law and how it's being introduced across the world, and I've even suggested more than once that Amitai Etzioni is either the top Israeli spy in the White House (known to the FBI as "Mega") or he knows who it is, but they've never bothered to comment or make a statement that my allegations were false, not even once. In fact, Etzioni's initial response to our manifesto was to put a link to it on his blog titled, "and now a word from our detractors." He quickly removed the link to the ACL from his blog, but it's remained on the Communitarian Network's Links page since April 2003.

Maybe someday Etzioni will leave a comment and reassure us about any other "shocking but false" things we link to at the ACL.